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Bargaining and distribution of power in the EU's Conciliation Committee

Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - 2003

makers , understanding of the final stage of the procedure bargaining in the Conciliation Committee is crucial. Here, EP and … bargaining theory to predict inter-institutional agreements in the Conciliation Committee, it turns out that although …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509443

Are world leaders loss averse?

Gould, Matthew; Rablen, Matthew D. - 2019

aversion (λ = 4:4) in the Qualified Majority rule in the Treaty of Lisbon, when understood as a Nash bargaining outcome. World …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012038990

Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses

Kim, Duk Gyoo; Lim, Wooyoung - 2019

bargaining. If we are dealing with a loss, that is, if we consider manyplayer "divide-the-penalty" games for, e.g., the location …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012157339

The effect of network degree on bargaining : experimental evidence from the field

D'Exelle, Ben; Gutekunst, Christine; Riedl, Arno - 2025

affects bargaining demands and outcomes. We combine data from a bilateral bargaining experiment with data of trade networks in … the disclosure of participants’ identities in a bargaining pair. We derive hypotheses on how degree should affect behavior … and find partial support for them. Specifically, we observe that individual degree affects bargaining demands in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015394146

Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 2010

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965090

On a three-alternative Condorcet jury theorem

Goertz, Johanna M. M.; Maniquet, François - 2011

We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three alternatives. The environment is the same as in the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet (1785)). Voters have common preferences that depend on the unknown state of nature, and they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009127595

Voting in small committees

Balduzzi, Paolo; Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - 2012

A small committee has to approve/reject a project with uncertain return. Members have different preferences: some are value-maximizers, others are biased towards approval. We focus on the efficient use of scarce information when communication is not guaranteed, and we provide insights on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490613

Equitable representation in the councils of the United Nations : theory and application

Gould, Matthew; Rablen, Matthew - 2013

We develop a theoretical framework for equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a fully representative voting body delegates decision-making to a subset of the members, as describes, e.g., the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Three equity concepts are proposed: ex-ante...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010223052

Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests

Nitsan, Shemuʾel; Ueda, Kaoru - 2013

Collective contests are examined permitting heterogeneity of stakes within every competing group. Our first concern is whether unequal distribution of stakes in a group can enhance its win probability. Our second concern is whether a large stake in a group can be individually disadvantageous. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009700302

Over-caution of large committees of experts

Midjord, Rune; Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás; Valsek, … - 2014

In this paper, we consider a committee of experts that decides whether to approve or reject a proposed innovation on behalf of society. In addition to a payoff linked to the adequateness of the committee's decision, each expert receives a disesteem payoff if he/she voted in favor of an ill-fated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010356364