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Strategic implications of counter-geoengineering : clash or cooperation

Heyen, Daniel; Horton, Joshua B.; Moreno Cruz, Juan - 2018

international cooperation. Our game-theoretical model of asymmetric countries allows for a rigorous analysis of the strategic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011884418

Altruistic cooperation

Stenzel, Aurel; Lohse, Johannes; Requate, Tilman; … - 2025

We characterize 'Games of Altruistic Cooperation' as a class of games in which cooperation leaves the individual and … and/or communication support altruistic cooperation to sustain the welfare of future generations. Without punishment or … communication, cooperation is low; communication alone even increases the incidence of zero contributions. However, combining peer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015401999

Group contests with complementarities in efforts

Kolmar, Martin; Rommeswinkel, Hendrik - 2010

Usually, groups increase their productivity by the specialization of their group members. In these cases, group output is no longer simply a sum of individual outputs. We analyze contests with group-specific public goods that allow for different degrees of complementarity between group members'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003994514

Technological determinants of the group-size paradox

Kolmar, Martin; Rommeswinkel, Hendrik - 2011

The present paper analyzes situations in which groups compete for rents. A major result in the literature has been that there are both cases where larger groups have advantages and cases where they have disadvantages. The paper provides two intuitive criteria which for groups with homogenous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011374

Group contests with internal conflict and power asymmetry

Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo - 2014

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the same time engage in contest with fellow group members to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members'efforts, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467392

Voting on punishment systems within a heterogeneous group

Noussair, Charles; Tan, Fangfang - 2009

We consider a voluntary contributions game, in which players may punish others after contributions are made and observed. The productivity of contributions, as captured in the marginal-per-capita return, differs among individuals, so that there are two types: high and low productivity. Every two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003882556

Self-enforcing agreements under unequal nationally determined contributions

Silva, Emilson C. D. - 2016

For a large global economy with normal goods, and an unequal world income distribution, we consider the endogenous formation and stability of an international environmental agreement (IEA) under nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Nations share green R&D efforts and enjoy R&D spillovers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011415922

Does a change of government influence compliance with international agreements? : empirical evidence for the NATO two percent target

Blum, Johannes; Potrafke, Niklas - 2019

We examine whether changes of government influence compliance with international agreements. We investigate compliance with the NATO two percent target to which all NATO countries committed themselves during the NATO summit in Wales in 2014. The dataset includes the military expenditure by NATO...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011966866

Observable strategies, commitments, and contracts

Wärneryd, Karl Erik - 2014

We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437999

Negotiating to avoid "gradual" versus "dangerous" climate change : an experimental test of two prisoners' dilemmas

Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - 2014

According to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, global collective action is needed to stabilize "greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous [our emphasis] anthropogenic interference with the climate system." The Framework Convention thus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010229864