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Fuest, Clemens; Kolmar, Martin - 2004

We develop a two-region model where the decentralized provision of spillover goods can be financed by means of taxes or user fees. In order to enforce the fees regions have to invest in exclusion. We show that a decentralized solution tends to be inefficient. There will be over-investment in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402495

Tax competition, excludable public goods and user charges

Huber, Bernd; Runkel, Marco - 2004

This paper provides an economic explanation for the increasing reliance of the state on revenue from user charges on excludable public goods. We develop a model with many identical countries. The government of each country levies a capital tax on the domestic production sector and supplies an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402456

Reciprocity networks and the participation problem

Dufwenberg, Martin; Patel, Amrish - 2014

private provision of public goods. We examine whether reciprocity can resolve the associated coordination problem. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383392

All it takes is one : the effect of weakest-link and summation aggregation on public good provision under threshold uncertainty

Carlsson, Frederik; Ek, Claes; Lange, Andreas - 2021

We report experimental evidence on the voluntary provision of public goods under threshold uncertainty. By explicitly comparing two prominent technologies, summation and weakest link, we show that uncertainty is particularly detrimental to threshold attainment under weakest link, where low...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012696938

Voting on thresholds for public goods : experimental evidence

Rauchdobler, Julian; Sausgruber, Rupert; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2009

equilibrium into a coordination game with a set of Pareto-superior equilibria. Thresholds may therefore improve efficiency in the … voluntary provision of public goods. In our one-shot experiment, we find that coordination often fails and exogenously imposed …, because voting may facilitate coordination due to signaling and commitment effects. We find that voting does have signaling …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003923574

Living in two neighborhoods : social interactions in the LAB

Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon - 2003

Field evidence suggests that agents belonging to the same group tend to behave similarly, i.e., behavior exhibits social interaction effects. Testing for such effects raises severe identification problems. We conduct an experiment that avoids these problems. The main design feature is that each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507945

The political economy of the international tax transparency agenda in the G20/OECD context

Schuknecht, Ludger; Siegerink, Vincent - 2021

This paper empirically analyses the motives underlying progress in implementing multilateral tax transparency standards. The results point to the protection of domestic special interests as a potential motive behind slower and less rigorous implementation. In particular, jurisdictions with a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415416

Suicide attacks and religious cleavages

Filote, Andra; Potrafke, Niklas; Ursprung, Heinrich W. - 2015

Many experts claim that the incidence of suicide attacks is driven by religious cleavages. To test this hypothesis, we investigate whether the total number of suicide attacks per violent conflict or the annual number of suicide attacks per country is associated with simmering religious...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010475337

Advancing global carbon abatement with a two-tier climate club

Iverson, Terrence - 2022

A two-tier climate club exploits the comparative advantage of large countries to mete out punishments through trade, while taking their capacity to resist punishment as a constraint. Countries outside the coalition price carbon at a fixed fraction of the average carbon price adopted within the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013285515

Political parties and network formation

Miettinen, Topi (contributor); Poutvaara, Panu (contributor) - 2006

We argue that anticorruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anticorruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003301061