-level comparisons, trade deflection is not profitable because external tariffs are rather similar and transportation costs are non … adjustment of external tariffs and ex ante selection effects. The pervasive and unconditional use of RoOs is, therefore, hard to …

We study, theoretically and empirically, how countries choose intra-bloc tariffs and preferential margins when they … to a customs union (where members coordinate external tariffs). Moreover, in customs unions (but not necessarily in free …

reduces the potency of a country’s optimal tariffs and therefore its incentive for unilaterally opting out of trade … liberalization. Thus, MFN can be a catalyst for trade liberalization. However, when PTAs take the form of customs unions, the … efficiency case for MFN as well as its pro-liberalization effect is weaker since one country finds itself deliberately excluded …

We show that multilateral tariff binding liberalization substantially impacts the nature and extent of Preferential … incentive of FTA members under relatively low bindings. Second, multilateral tariff binding liberalization shapes the role … played by PTAs in the attainment of global free trade. Initially, tariff binding liberalization leads to Custom Union (CU …

incentive to contribute to the cost of liberalization by signing trade agreements and offering their own market access. I extend … the equilibrium model of endogenous trade liberalization via trade agreements developed by Saggi and Yildiz (2010) to …

tariffs in these two cases considering three different equilibria: Free Trade (FT), Free Trade Area (FTA), and Customs Union …

of the trade liberalization. Second, we use standard Armington- and Melitz-type general equilibrium trade models to …