to guide subjects' cooperation and punishment choices, including the virtually complete removal of antisocial punishment … systems exist that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be … preferred by the people. Here, we show that welfare-enhancing peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges …

-group behavior of Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals in a repeated public good game without and with punishment. We find that …

opportunity for profitable cooperation. Our experimental method creates two groups of subjects who are similar but have different … long-run losses. Initially similar, cooperation rates for groups with different intelligence levels diverge, declining in … groups of lower intelligence, and increasing to reach almost full cooperation levels in groups of higher intelligence …

hampers cooperation, as higher intelligence players are less cooperative once they are made aware that they play against …

mediated by differences in cognitive skills. Our design uses a Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, and we compare rates of cooperation … higher cooperation rates and profits than in separated groups (with consistent gains among lower IQ subjects and relatively …

artificial intelligence may or may not be cooperative. We study the deter-minants and forms of algorithmic cooperation in the … prisoner’s dilemma games played by humans in the lab. We find that the same factors that increase human cooperation largely … also determine the cooperation rates of algorithms. However, algorithms tend to play different strategies than humans …

a punishment regime, in which certain individuals are permitted, but not required, to have punishment directed toward … them. The punishment system can condition on type and contribution history. The results indicate that the most effective … regime, in terms of contributions and earnings, is one that allows punishment of low contributors only, regardless of …

pillar is internalized norms of cooperation, sustained by emotions such as guilt and shame. The second pillar is the … motivation can sustain cooperation if enough people cooperate but can jeopardise social order if many others follow selfish … inclinations. The third pillar are sanctions meted out to anyone who does not cooperate; ideally punishment can work as a mere …