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Buy-It-Now" or "Sell-It-Now" auctions : effects of changing bargaining power in sequential trading mechanisms
Grebe, Tim; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine - 2015
We study experimentally the effect of bargaining power in two sequential mechanisms that offer the possibility to trade at a fixed price before an auction. In the "Buy-It-Now" format, the seller has the bargaining power and offers a price prior to the auction; whereas in the "Sell-It-Now"...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011406561
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Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions
Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kocher, Martin; … - 2021
Overbidding in second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We …. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012668312
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Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
Biran, Omer; Forges, Françoise - 2010
characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in … possible explanation for cartels' structures (not) observed in practice. -- auctions ; Bayesian game ; collusion ; core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003974150
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The Herodotus Paradox
Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Daniel J.; Vries, Casper G. de - 2010
The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the two-player case with complete and incomplete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003994504
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Extremism drives out moderation
Klose, Bettina; Kovenock J., Dan - 2012
modeled as all-pay auctions with identity-dependent externalities. In this context, we define centrists and radicals using a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009533958
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Selling to the mean
Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2015
We study optimal selling strategies of a seller who is poorly informed about the buyer’s value for the object. When the maxmin seller only knows that the mean of the distribution of the buyer's valuations belongs to some interval then nature can keep him to payoff zero no matter how much...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011298549
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The design of ambiguous mechanisms
Di Tillio, Alfredo; Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2014
This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399062
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Self-allocation in contests
Bernergård, Axel; Wärneryd, Karl Erik - 2017
We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one where no contestant would wish to change his choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011718621
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Spite vs. risk : explaining overbidding
Kirchkamp, Oliver; Mill, Wladislaw - 2019
overbidding in auctions. As a workhorse we use the second-price all-pay and the first-price winner-pay auction. Both risk and … spite can be used to rationalize deviations from risk neutral equilibrium bids in auctions. We exploit that equilibrium … predictions in the second-price all-pay auctions for spiteful preferences are different than those for risk averse preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012002983
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Auctions and corruption
Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397659