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Conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion
Cubitt, Robin P.; Gächter, Simon; Quercia, Simone - 2015
We investigate whether there is a link between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion. We use a public goods game to classify subjects by type of contribution preference and by belief about the contributions of others; and we measure betrayal aversion for different categories of subject....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011298544
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When focal points are out of focus : a game-theoretic analysis of Come Dine with Me
Schüller, David; Bayındır-Upmann, Thorsten - 2013
possesses a "zero equilibrium" - i. e. a Nash equilibrium where all players evaluate each other with the lowest available scores … - as well as numberless "non-zero equilibria". Since the former is an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies, it may … this focal point, nor did they (with one exception) play any other equilibrium. We provide potential explanations for this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009712440
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Efficient coordination in weakest-link games
Riedl, Arno; Rohde, Ingrid M. T.; Strobel, Martin - 2011
coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, especially in larger groups. We hypothesize that people will be able to coordinate on … equilibrium, irrespective of group size. This leads to substantial welfare effects. Achieved welfare is between 40 and 60 percent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009412373
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Reciprocity networks and the participation problem
Dufwenberg, Martin; Patel, Amrish - 2014
Reciprocity can be a powerful motivation for human behaviour. Scholars argue that it is relevant in the context of private provision of public goods. We examine whether reciprocity can resolve the associated coordination problem. The interaction of reciprocity with cost-sharing is critical....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383392
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Do leaders affect ethical conduct?
D'Adda, Giovanna; Darai, Donja; Weber, Roberto A. - 2014
We study whether leaders influence the unethical conduct of followers. To avoid selection issues present in natural environments, we use a laboratory experiment in which we form groups and assign leadership roles at random. We study an environment in which groups compete, with dishonest behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383805
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On the persistence of strategic sophistication
Georganas, Sotiris; Healy, Paul J.; Weber, Roberto A. - 2014
We examine whether the "Level-k" model of strategic behavior generates reliable cross-game predictions within an individual. We find no correlation in subjects' estimated levels of reasoning across two families of games. Furthermore, estimating a higher level for Ann than Bob in one family of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010249635
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Cooperating, fast and slow : testing the social heuristics hypothesis
Strømland, Eirik; Tjøtta, Sigve; Torsvik, Gaute - 2016
Are humans intuitively cooperative, or do we need to deliberate in order to be generous to others? The Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH) proposes that fast instinctive decision making promotes cooperation in social dilemmas. In this paper, we conduct a novel time-pressure experiment to shed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011458007
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Lies in disguise : a theoretical analysis of cheating
Dufwenberg, Martin <Jr>; Dufwenberg, Martin - 2016
in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium captures the stylized facts from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011566513
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Frustration and anger in games
Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Dufwenberg, Martin; Smith, Alec - 2015
Frustration, anger, and aggression have important consequences for economic and social behavior, concerning for example monopoly pricing, contracting, bargaining, traffic safety, violence, and politics. Drawing on insights from psychology, we develop a formal approach to exploring how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496082
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Co-financing agreements and reciprocity : when "no deal" is a good deal
Jang, Dooseok; Patel, Amrish; Dufwenberg, Martin - 2016
Institutions for co-financing agreements often exist to encourage public good investment. Can such frameworks deliver maximal investment when agents are motivated by reciprocity? We demonstrate that indeed they can, but not in the way one might expect. If maximal investment is impossible in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011568751