evidence on punishment preferences, in which subjects reveal a heterogeneous preference for punishing wrongdoers, our model … identifies circumstances in which “punitive” individuals (with stronger-than-average punishment preferences) will self …-select into law enforcement jobs that offer the opportunity to punish (or facilitate the punishment of) wrongdoers. Such “punitive …

can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any … attempts to increase the severity of punishment will alter the payoff of the individuals involved, leaving unchanged the … frequency of violation at equilibrium. This result is misleading: payoffs are not independent and the crime game can not be …

, arrest increases the probability an offender is charged with a crime. Our findings argue against recent calls for a …

of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly … will be punished is dissolved and the timing at which the punishment is actually imposed, as well as the combination …: either no delay (immediate resolution and immediate punishment) or maximum delay (both resolution and punishment as much as …

The empirical literature testing the economic theory of crime has extensively studied the relative importance of the … probability and the severity of punishment with reference to planned criminal activities. There are, however, also unplanned …

We provide evidence about voters' response to crime control policies. We exploit a natural experiment arising from the … were more likely to report crime news involving pardoned individuals; ii) voters held worse beliefs on the incumbent … governments ability to control crime and iii) with respect to the previous elections, the incumbent national government …

. Moreover, in these municipalities: i) newspapers were more likely to report crime news involving pardoned individuals; ii …) voters held worse beliefs on the incumbent national government's ability to control crime and iii) with respect to the …

Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in … their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having com …- mitted a crime in a country must be extradited back. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement …