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How many patents does it take to signal innovation quality?
Comino, Stefano; Graziano, Clara - 2014
patentability standards at PTOs (Patent and Trademark Offices awarding so-called bad patents), not only "false innovators" have the … chance of being granted patents but also, and more interestingly, "true innovators" are forced to patent more intensively … distortions caused by bad patents. Moreover, we show that introducing a two-tiered patent system is unlikely to improve market …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366175
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Price-dependent profit sharing as an escape from the Bertrand paradox
Foros, Øystein (contributor);  … - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003495802
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Imitation : theory and experimental evidence
Alpesteguia, Jose; Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Joerg - 2003
We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation models and subject themodels to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the differentpredictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, notto different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509505
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Merger without cost advantages
Huck, Steffen (contributor); Konrad, Kai A. (contributor);  … - 2005
The seminal paper by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) showed that merger in a standard Cournot framework with linear demand and linear costs is not profitable unless a large majority of the firms are involved in the merger. However, many strategic aspects matter for firm competition such as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002757958
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Strategic delegation in experimental markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Norman, Hans-Theo - 2000
In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781566
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Preemption in capacity and price determination : a study of endogenous timing of decisions for homogeneous markets
Güth, Sandra; Güth, Werner - 2000
Endogenous timing can help to derive the time structure of decision making instead of assuming it as exogenously given. In our study we consider a homogeneous market where, like in the model of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), sellers determine sales capacities before prices. Sellers must serve...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781586
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Strategic export motives and linking emission markets
Antoniou, Fabio; Hatzipanayotou, Panos; Tsakiris, Nikos - 2021
We explore the possibility of achieving a cooperative outcome when governments act non-cooperatively in a strategic environmental policy model where emission permit markets are linked. We introduce a specific distribution scheme of the permit revenues between the exporting countries so as to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012418620
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Induced price leadership and (counter-)spying rivals' play under incomplete information
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2019
We analyze spying out a rival's price in a Bertrand market game with incomplete information. Spying transforms a simultaneous into a robust sequential moves game. We provide conditions for profitable espionage. The spied at firm may attempt to immunize against spying by delaying its pricing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962353
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An experimental analysis of the complications in colluding when firms are asymmetric
Mason, Charles F. - 2018
I study an indefinitely repeated game where firms differ in size. Attempts to form cartels in such an environment, for example by rationing outputs in a manner linked to firm size differences, have generally struggled. Any successful cartel has to set production shares in a manner that ensures...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011847549
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Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion : the case of spying and counter-spying
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2021
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333