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When is voting optimal?
Ben-Yashar, Ruth; Danziger, Leif - 2014
We consider a framework where the optimal decision rule determining the collective choice depends in a simple way on the decision makers’ posterior probabilities of a particular state of nature. Nevertheless, voting is generally an inefficient way to make collective choices and this paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010462767
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Symmetric and asymmetric committees
Ben-Yashar, Ruth; Danziger, Leif - 2011
This paper studies the assignment of decision makers to two committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. There is an even number of decision makers at each of various skill levels and each committee has an odd number of members. Surprisingly, even with the symmetric assumptions in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009162101
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The unanimity rule and extremely asymmetric committees
Ben-Yashar, Ruth; Danziger, Leif - 2016
This paper analyzes how to allocate experts into committees that use the unanimity rule to make decisions. We show that an optimal allocation of experts is extremely asymmetric. To reach the optimal allocation, therefore, one needs only to rank the experts in terms of their abilities and then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011452816
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Voting in hiring committees : which "almost" rule is optimal?
Baharad, Eyal; Danziger, Leif - 2018
We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almostplurality,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011789019
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Level r consensus and stable social choice
Mahajne, Muhammad; Nitsan, Shemuʾel; Volij, Oscar - 2014
We propose the concept of level r consensus as a useful property of a preference profile which considerably enhances the stability of social choice. This concept involves a weakening of unanimity, the most extreme form of consensus. It is shown that if a preference profile exhibits level r...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010356368
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A threshold model of urban development
Vesperoni, Alberto; Schweinzer, Paul - 2018
We propose a simple model of distribution of economic activity across cities of endogenous size and number determined by individual incentives in the tradition of threshold models of social interaction. The individuals populating our model are endowed with idiosyncratic entrepreneurial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011927895
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On a three-alternative Condorcet jury theorem
Goertz, Johanna M. M.; Maniquet, François - 2011
well, including those in which voters vote informatively. -- efficient information aggregation ; simple plurality rule …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009127595
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Robust information aggregation through voting
Midjord, Rune; Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás; Valasek, Justin - 2019
Numerous theoretical studies have shown that information aggregation through voting is fragile. We consider a model of … information aggregation with vote-contingent payoffs and generically characterize voting behavior in large committees. We use this … and unique information aggregation can be achieved with vote-contingent payoffs whose size varies depending on which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012029166
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On the optimal composition of committees
Ben-Yashar, Ruth; Danziger, Leif - 2014
This paper derives a simple characterization of how to optimally divide an organization's experts into different decision-making committees. The focus is on many three-member committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. We find that the allocation of experts to committees is optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256159
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Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger
Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 2010
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965090