I study a model of procurement with moral hazard and adverse selection. The procurer is either corrupt or honest and … can choose between sole-sourcing and competitive tender. I compare two procurement regulations: no sole-sourcing is … the gain to corruption is big, a flexible procurement regulation may be better than a rigid procurement regulation. If the …

Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient … allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex … post moral hazard after the competitive process is over. A procurement mechanism must combine an incentive scheme with the …

We analyse procurement auctions in which sellers are distinguished on the basis of the ratios of quality per unit of …

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … use of negotiations as a procurement mechanism in private industry. …

Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constraint optimal award …