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Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard
Chakraborty, Indranil; Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques - 2021
Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient … allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex … post moral hazard after the competitive process is over. A procurement mechanism must combine an incentive scheme with the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012421254
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Vertical product differentiation when quality is unobservable to buyers : presented at CESifo Area Conference on Industrial Organisation, March 2003
Orosel, Gerhard O.; Zauner, Klaus G. - 2004
We analyze vertical product differentiation in a model where a good's quality is unobservable to buyers before purchase, a continuum of quality levels is technologically feasible, and minimum quality is supplied under competitive conditions. After purchase the true quality of the good is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450700
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Auctions and corruption
Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397659
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Probabilistic procurement auctions
Giebe, Thomas; Schweinzer, Paul - 2013
We analyse procurement auctions in which sellers are distinguished on the basis of the ratios of quality per unit of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009765519
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Optimal cost overruns : procurement auctions and renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schwarz, Marco A. - 2016 - This version: March 18, 2016
Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constraint optimal award …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011447525
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Auctions vs. negotiations : the effects of inefficient renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2015
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … use of negotiations as a procurement mechanism in private industry. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496962
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Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas
Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2000
We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781529
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Contesting fake news
Rehsmann, Daniel; Roussillon, Béatrice; Schweinzer, Paul - 2023
We model competition on a credence market governed by an imperfect label, signaling high quality, as a rank-order tournament between firms. In this market interaction, asymmetric firms jointly and competitively control the underlying quality ranking's precision by releasing individual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014336462
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Asymmetric information and differentiated durable goods monopoly : intra-period versus intertemporal price discrimination
Laussel, Didier; Long, Ngo Van; Resende, Joana - 2021
A durable good monopolist faces a continuum of heterogeneous customers who make purchase decisions by comparing present and expected price-quality offers. The monopolist designs a sequence of price-quality menus to segment the market. We consider the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of a game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012619439
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Strategic supply function competition with private information
Vives, Xavier - 2009
A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003910453