the relational index contract in order to improve incentives. … performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are non-verifiable so that … measurements), the optimal self-enforcing (relational) contract between a principal and a multitasking agent is an index contract …

systematically consider three major classes of incentive schemes: continuous piece rate incentives, discrete bonus schemes, and … tournament incentives. We find that pay inequality has a strong negative effect on perceived fairness. Controlling for pay …

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral … hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are … concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that are doomed to fail when there are only selfish actors provide powerful …

Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from traditional moral-hazard settings …. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties, which real-world contracts rarely use. I show that … the implicit assumption of deterministic contracts makes payments to third parties necessary. This paper studies …

This paper quantifies a tenant-side "split incentives" problem that exists when the largest commercial sector customers … are on electricity-included property lease contracts causing them to face a marginal electricity price of zero. We use … exogenous variation in weather shocks to show that the largest firms on tenant-paid contracts use up to 14 percent less …

We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an …

' private information about risk tolerance, offer a sensible way to approach the problem. These contracts are generally a …

I analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent and can influence the agent’s marginal return of …

In many markets supply contracts include a series of small, regular payments made by consumers and a single, large … bonus contracts, which builds on a model of attentional focusing. Our main result identifies market conditions under which … bonus contracts should be observed: while a monopolist pays a bonus to consumers - if at all - only for low-value goods …