Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 853
Cover Image
Attention and selection effects
Ambuehl, Sandro; Ockenfels, Axel; Stewart, Colin - 2018
Who participates in transactions when information about the consequences must be learned? We show theoretically that decision makers for whom acquiring and processing information is more costly respond more strongly to changes in incentive payments for participating and decide to participate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011863553
Cover Image
Signaling versus costly information acquisition
Bester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei - 2018
In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011888619
Cover Image
Do managers with limited liability take more risky decisions? : an information acquisition model
Malcomson, James M. - 2010
acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability … an additional reason to those in the classic principal-agent literature for using contracts with pay increasing in the … ; principal-agent contracts ; asymmetric information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937594
Cover Image
Nitpicky insurers and the law of contracts
Bourgeon, Jean-Marc; Picard, Pierre M. - 2017
that hardly explains the many features of an insurance contract. We extend this setup to include the situation that the … costlessly observable, then it should be included in the contract to improve the risk sharing-incentive trade-off under moral … resulting incompleteness of the contract opens the door to controversies and disputes that may lead to judicial procedures. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011723471
Cover Image
Learning from failures : optimal contract for experimentation and production
Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Rodivilov, Alexander - 2018
derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011926023
Cover Image
Communicating subjective evaluations
Lang, Matthias - 2014
Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. If she does not provide justification, her message space is restricted, but the message is costless. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361447
Cover Image
Self-confidence and reactions to subjective performance evaluations
Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander - 2018
their own, but reward significantly evaluations exceeding their own. Our analysis exploits data from a principal-agent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011927889
Cover Image
Trust, investment and competition : theory and evidence from German car manufacturers
Calzolari, Giacomo; Felli, Leonardo; Koenen, Johannes; … - 2019
, we show that more trust in a relationship is associated with higher idiosyncratic investment by suppliers and better part … relationships involving higher trust, buyers are able to induce higher investment and more intense competition among suppliers - but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012026390
Cover Image
Dynamic rational inattention and the Phillips curve
Afrouzi, Hassan; Yang, Choongryul - 2021
We develop a fast, tractable, and robust method for solving the transition path of dynamic rational inattention problems in linear-quadratic-Gaussian settings. As an application of our general framework, we develop an attention-driven theory of dynamic pricing in which the Phillips curve slope...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012417763
Cover Image
Observable strategies, commitments, and contracts
Wärneryd, Karl Erik - 2014
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437999