their common presence on the platform. We finally show that these crowdfunding dynamics stir platform growth, with important …

We study a platformâs incentives to delist IP-infringing products and the effects of holding the platform liable for … the presence of such products on innovation and consumer welfare. For a given number of buyers, platform liability … interests between innovators and buyers. Furthermore, platform liability can have unintended consequences, which overturn the …

Platform interoperability is considered a powerful tool to promote competition in digital markets when network effects …. When one ("large") platform has an installed base of customers, its incentive to make its services interoperable is lower … than for the other, smaller platform. However, mandating interoperability between the asymmetric platforms is not always …

We present a general and tractable oligopoly model of multi-sided platforms with endogenous side and platform choices … characterize optimal platform pricing. Using the equilibrium conditions, we formally derive (across sides and platforms) switching …-subsidization" result. We then provide a unifying framework to analyze multi-sided platform mergers, which rationalizes mixed results from …

mediating the interactions between consumers and firms. When platform competition is intense, more consumers subscribe to the … platform hosting the Superstar exclusively. This mechanism is self-reinforcing as firms follow consumer decisions and (some …) join exclusively the platform with the Superstar. Exclusivity always benefits firms and may benefit consumers. Moreover …

determine equilibrium fee and category decisions that depend on the extent of fee discrimination available to the platform and … find that greater fee discrimination allows the platform to serve more markets in its marketplace but also increases fees … in high surplus markets. However, if the platform enters into retail, then the platform reduces its fees and generates …

We study a platform's design of membership and transaction fees when sellers compete and buyers cannot observe the … prices and features of goods without incurring search costs. The platform alleviates sellers' competition by charging them …

platform, leading to the implication that a platform can maximize its total profits by subsidizing one of its sides. We show … fill this gap by developing a model for platform competition in a differentiated setting (a Hoteling line), which is … that when both sides in a platform market multi-home, the strategic interdependence between the two sides of the same …