federalism in which centralization is less likely to occur where budget referendums are possible. The reason for this result is … that budget referendums reduce the extent to which pro-centralization regions can commit to a low level of spending … delegating the centralization choice to elected poli-cymakers. In addition, it reduces the ability of higher level policy …

centralization is not politically feasible, allowing an enhanced cooperation agreement among a subset of countries permits the latter … country, sub-union formation may be optimal. The relative advantage of a sub-union towards centralization increases when … they might lead to increased centralization. …

We propose a theory of tax centralization and inter governmental grants in politico-economic equilibrium. The cost of … the local level. This renders the degree of tax centralization and the tax burden determinate even if none of the … traditional, expenditure-related motives for centralization considered in the fiscal federalism literature is present. If central …

-agent framework, it analyzes two alternative policy-decision schemes - "decentralization" and "centralization" - when "knowledge …

This paper examines policy centralization outcomes in a two-jurisdiction, political economy model of public good … choice procedures, namely, direct democracy and representative democracy. We show that policy centralization is more likely … device by a pro-centralization jurisdiction and induce a reluctant partner to cooperate. In these situations, policy …

This paper analyzes the relationship between the size of an economic union and the degree of policy centralization. We … consider a political economy setting in which elected representatives bargain about the degree of centralization within the … outcome. We show that the relationship between the size of the union and centralization may be non-monotonic: Up to a certain …

́information is more relevant (centralization). The empirical analysis confirms that the importance of donors ́private information …