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Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. If she does not provide justification, her message space is restricted, but the message is costless. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361447
these findings within a relational contracting model that critically focuses on changes in the bargaining power, due to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012649766
-invest in early construction, seeking a renegotiation thereafter. We show that, in a renegotiation-proof contract, the marginal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012119945
We modify the Acquiring-a-Company game to study lying in ultimatum bargaining. Privately informed sellers send messages …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014265847
Neither marriage nor a legally enforceable contract serves any useful purpose if the parties have access to a perfect … enforceable contract. Separate-property marriage may reduce and community-property marriage actually eliminate inefficiency, but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227229
shock and a discretionary buyer transfer. In the absence of communication, we find that rigid contracts are more frequent … and lead to higher earnings for both buyer and seller. By contrast, in the presence of communication, flexible contracts … perceptions). We offer an explanation based on social norms. -- contract design ; communication ; experiments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571048
Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other's trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415967
derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011926023
Modern communication technologies enable efficient exchange of information, but often sacrifice direct human … interaction inherent in more traditional forms of communication. This raises the question of whether the lack of personal … consistent with social image concerns. The second experiment shows that dishonest individuals prefer to interact with a machine …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011825233
their contribution costs. We test the model in a laboratory experiment paying particular attention to how behavioral … statistically significant when we allow for non-payoff-maximizing behavior at each stage of the game. Introducing communication has …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361371