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This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with continuous, privately-observed agent types that are persistent over time. With fixed agent types, full separation is not possible when continuation equilibrium payoffs following revelation are on the Pareto frontier of attainable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011300994
We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral … incentives and become superior when there are also fair-minded players. These predictions are strongly supported by the results …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398105
provision of informal incentives. Developing a model of a long-term employment relationship, I show that generous upfront wages … incentives promising a bonus in exchange for effort are more effective. Then, a longer remaining time horizon increases the … employer’s commitment. Generally, direct and reciprocity-based incentives reinforce each other and should thus optimally be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012002999
rents can be used to provide incentives. Preferences for reciprocity still affect the structure of an employment … interaction. Therefore, reciprocity-based and repeated-game incentives are dynamic substitutes, but complements at any given point …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011718616
The standard economic analysis of the insured-insurer relationship under moral hazard postulates a simplistic setup that hardly explains the many features of an insurance contract. We extend this setup to include the situation that the insured was facing at the time of the accident and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011723471
Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from traditional moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties, which real-world contracts rarely use. I show that the implicit assumption of deterministic contracts makes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012697032
This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker's effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010388771
We analyze a multitasking model with a verifiable routine task and a skill-dependent activity characterized by moral hazard. Contracts negotiated by firm/employee pairs follow from Nash bargaining. High- and low-skilled employees specialize, intermediate productivity employees perform both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013201713
We study how informal buyer-supplier relationships in the German automotive industry affect procurement. Using unique data from a survey focusing on these, we show that more trust, the belief that the trading partner acts to maintain the mutual relationship, is associated with both higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012649766
bargaining, leading to stronger effort incentives and higher output. However, it also reduces incentives for labor market …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850266