We show theoretically and empirically that executives are paid less for their own firm's performance and more for their rivals' performance if an industry's firms are more commonly owned by the same set of investors. Higher common ownership also leads to higher unconditional total pay. We...

This study extends standard C-CAPM by including two additional factors related to firm size (SMB) and book-to-market value ratio (HML) the Fama-French factors. CCAPM is least able to price firms with low book-to-market ratios. The explanation of these returns, as well as the returns on the SMB...

This study investigates boards of (non-executive) directors and whether employee representation has a positive effect on gender diversity on boards. We exploit rich, newly assembled board–director matched panel data for Norway and Germany, which contain unique information on whether a director...

We construct a novel data set to show that, between 2003-2020, up to one-fifth of America's largest firms had a non-financial blockholder or insider as their largest shareholder. Blockholders and insiders tend to be less diversified than institutional investors. Measures of "universal" and...

The OECD in its BEPS action plan 4 addresses tax base erosion by profit shifting through the use of tax deductible interest payments. Their main concern is interest deductions between outbound and inbound investment by groups. Studies of multinational firms show that the tax sensitivity of debt...

This paper proposes and evaluates alternative methods for addressing the tax treatment of interest expenses in a multijurisdictional setting. The differential deductibility of debt entailed by various current tax law provisions leads to potential distortions in the patterns of asset ownership...

Multinational companies can exploit the tax advantage of debt more aggressively than national companies by shifting debt from affiliates in low tax countries to affiliates in high tax countries. Previous papers have either omitted internal debt or external debt from the analysis. We are the...

Private independent limited partnership venture capital funds receive capital from institutional investors, without tax incentives. Limited partnership investment activities are governed by restrictive covenants that are determined by negotiated contract between the fund managers (general...

The Berle-Means problem - information and incentive asymmetries disrupting relations between knowledgeable managers and remote investors - has remained a durable issue engaging researchers since the 1930's. However, the Berle-Means paradigm - widely-dispersed, helpless investors facing strong,...

This paper examines the impact of thin capitalization rules that limit the tax deductibility of interest on the capital structure of the foreign affiliates of US multinationals. We construct a new data set on thin capitalization rules in 54 countries for the period 1982-2004. Using confidential...