, competition does not eliminate but rather exacerbates inefficiencies arising from contracting with focused agents. Common contract …

-invest in early construction, seeking a renegotiation thereafter. We show that, in a renegotiation-proof contract, the marginal …

that hardly explains the many features of an insurance contract. We extend this setup to include the situation that the … costlessly observable, then it should be included in the contract to improve the risk sharing-incentive trade-off under moral … resulting incompleteness of the contract opens the door to controversies and disputes that may lead to judicial procedures. We …

. Agents decide on a contract-specific and non-verifiable investment. Incentive compatibility requires that initial contracts …

derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …