integrated with climate dynamics, a grand climate coalition or multiple climate coalitions may form in equilibrium, but if the …

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of … international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without … becoming coalition members themselves. Rather, their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, which …

policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …

policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …

countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset of the … parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The small stable … coalition is not very effective in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The ineffectiveness is …

multilateral coalitional structures are not stable; however, the size of the stable coalition increases as the economy expands. …

This paper considers endogenous coalition formations and endogenous technology choices in a model of private provision … contributions by a strategic incentive to adopt lower technology to motivate coalition building by other nations, which in the end …

with respect to both emissions and membership. In that encompassing IEA game the size of the coalition is increasing in the … values, the grand coalition may or may not be attained if one of the moral parameter increases and tends towards one. …