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Yardstick competition, corruption, and electoral incentives

Long, Ngo Van (contributor); … - 2008

the static setting with a dynamic scenario where each incumbent politician faces an election after a finite, fixed term …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003730296

Electoral control when policies are for sale

Farvaque, Étienne; Lagadec, Gael - 2009

This article analyses the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. It extends the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model [Grossman G., Helpman E. [1994], "Protection for sale", American Economic Review, 84, 4, 833-850] to include sanctions from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003806719

Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?

Fiva, Jon H.; Natvik, Gisle James - 2009

We identify exogenous variation in incumbent policymakers' re-election probabilities and explore empirically how this … variation affects the incumbents' investment in physical capital. Our results indicate that a higher re-election probability …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003861777

Moderating political extremism : single round vs runoff elections under plurality rule

Bordignon, Massimo; Tabellini, Guido Enrico - 2009

equilibrium policy is smaller, because their bargaining power is reduced compared to a single ballot election. The predictions on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003824705

Reforming legislatures : is one house better than two?

Facchini, Giovanni; Testa, Cecilia - 2009

During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we propose a theoretical framework casting some lights on the drawbacks of bicameral state legislatures and on the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms. In a setting where lawmakers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850512

Federalism and accountability with distorted election choices

Kessing, Sebastian - 2009

Random factors such as bad weather or exogenous economic shocks affect the re-election of politicians and can reduce … accountability. Such distorted election choices interact with the architecture of government. Contrasting centralized with … decentralized political systems, this study shows that centralization is likely to result in higher accountability if election …