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Do managers with limited liability take more risky decisions? : an information acquisition model
Malcomson, James M. - 2010
Risk-neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability. Risk-neutral managers may not when … actions. The resulting decisions may be less, rather than more, risky. Making a decision after acquiring information provides … return. Further results on the form of contracts are also derived. -- managers ; risky decisions ; limited liability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937594
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Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority
Englmaier, Florian; Filipi, Ales; Singh, Ravi - 2010
of authority balances the value of the manager's decision-making expertise against the cost of ensuring that the manager … principal may delegate additional authority in order to screen for managers of high ability. -- agency problems ; delegation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003942661
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Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers
Non, Arjan - 2011
By incorporating reciprocity in an otherwise standard principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some, but not all, workers care more for their principal when they are convinced that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009261791
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Incentives to motivate
Kvaløy, Ola; Schöttner, Anja - 2014
We present a model in which a motivator can take costly actions - or what we call motivational effort - in order to reduce the effort costs of a worker, and analyze the optimal combination of motivational effort and monetary incentives. We distinguish two cases. First, the firm owner chooses the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010250173
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Overwhelmed by routine tasks : a multi-tasking principal agent perspective
Demougin, Dominique; Helm, Carsten - 2022
We analyze a multitasking model with a verifiable routine task and a skill-dependent activity characterized by moral hazard. Contracts negotiated by firm/employee pairs follow from Nash bargaining. High- and low-skilled employees specialize, intermediate productivity employees perform both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013201713
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Do firms gain from managerial overconfidence? : the role of severance pay
Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - 2022
We analyze the effects of optimism and overconfidence when the manager's compensation package includes severance pay and the CEO has bargaining power. We find that optimism does not affect incentive pay but increases severance pay with a negative effect on profit. Overconfidence, on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013255972
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CEO compensation
Frydman, Carola; Jenter, Dirk - 2010
result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008797772
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Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants
Hili, Amal; Laussel, Didier; Long, Ngo Van - 2016
We analyze the optimal contract between a risk-averse manager and the initial shareholders in a two-period model where …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538964
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EVA and the controllability-congruence trade-off : an empirical investigation
Ponssard, Jean-Pierre; Larmande, François - 2004
qualitative feedback from the managers involved, are analyzed. It is argued that EVA bonus schemes may have a major …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450490
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CEO compensation : evidence from the field
Edmans, Alex; Gosling, Tom; Jenter, Dirk - 2021
an important reference point. This causes CEO pay to be affected by external risks, in contrast to optimal risk sharing. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584217