The standard economic analysis of the insured-insurer relationship under moral hazard postulates a simplistic setup that hardly explains the many features of an insurance contract. We extend this setup to include the situation that the insured was facing at the time of the accident and the...

Guaranteed renewability is a prominent feature in many health and life insurance markets. It is well established in the literature that, when there is (only) risk type uncertainty, the optimal GR contract with renewal price set at the actuarially fair price for low risk types provides full...

We still know little about what motivates the informal care arrangements provided in old age. The introduction of demand-side subsidies such as unconditional caregiving allowances (cash benefits designed either to incentivize the provision of informal care, or compensate for the loss of...

One of the most common reasons for people to save is in order to pay for their care in later life. However, the effect of long-term care subsidies on savings is far from clear. In this paper we take advantage of a policy intervention to study the effect on savings and savings behaviour of the...

Empirical evidence that migrants send home more remittances after disasters raises the question of whether remittances can be used to self-insure, substituting for both formal and informal insurance. We investigate this question using a unique data set on the usage patterns of financial services...

Long-term care (LTC) is the largest insurable risk that old-age individuals face in most western societies. However, the demand for LTC insurance is still ostensibly small in comparison to the financial risk, which is reflected in the formation of expectations of insurance coverage. One...

We study biased survival expectations across two domains and examine whether such biased expectations influence health and financial behaviors. Combining individual-level longitudinal data, retrospective, and end of life data from several European countries for more than a decade, we estimate...

Socio-economic differences in longevity have fuelled a debate whether pension systems have a regressive bias favouring groups with a high life expectancy. We show that the distributional implications of such pooling depend critically on the benefit profile across age/time, which in turn is...

We analyze a repeated game in which countries are polluting as well as investing in technologies. While folk theorems point out that the first best can be sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium when the players are sufficiently patient, we derive the second best equilibrium when they are...

We analyze the optimal contract in static moral hazard situations, where the agent’s effort is not verifiable. We first present the main trade-offs of the principal-agent model. We cover the trade-off of incentives (motivation) vs. risk-sharing (efficiency), incentives vs. rents (when the...