This paper presents a choice model based on a model for the behavior of brain cells that is based on neurological findings. The paper shows that it is possible to define choice as the result of a series of interconnected cellular processes, instead of framing the problem from the point of view...

We propose a model of instrumental belief choice under loss aversion. When new information arrives, an agent is prompted to abandon her prior. However, potential posteriors may induce her to take actions that generate a lower utility in some states than actions induced by her prior. These losses...

We examine framing effects in nudging honesty, in the spirit of the growing norm-nudge literature, by utilizing a high-powered and pre-registered study. Across four treatments, participants received one random truthful norm-nudge that emphasized ‘moral suasion’ based on either what other...

We formulate a simple quantum decision model of the Ellsberg paradox. We report the results of an experiment we performed to test the matching probabilities predicted by this model using an incentive compatible method. We find that the theoretical predictions of the model are in conformity with...

This paper investigates how migration and location choice decisions depend on a large set of location characteristics, with particular focus on measuring the importance and nature of the non-monetary cost of moving. We employ a stated-preference approach to elicit respondents' choice...

Ambiguous prospects are ubiquitous in social and economic life, but the psychological foundations of behavior under ambiguity are still not well understood. One of the most robust empirical regularities is the strong correlation between attitudes towards ambiguity and compound risk which...

We investigate whether violations of canonical axioms of choice under risk are mistakes or a manifestation of true preferences. First, we elicit axiom and gamble preferences and then allow subjects to revise their potentially conflicting preferences. Among the behavioral patterns that allow for...

In prosocial decisions, decision-makers are inherently uncertain about how their decisions impact others’ utility – we call this interpersonal uncertainty. We show that people’s response to interpersonal uncertainty shapes well-known patterns of prosocial behavior. First, using standard...

Loss aversion, risk aversion, and the probability weighting function (PWF) are three central concepts in explaining decisionmaking under risk. I examine interlinkages between these concepts in a model of decisionmaking that allows for loss averse/tolerant stochastic reference dependence and...

According to the endowment effect there is some discomfort associated with giving up a good, that is to say, we are willing to give up something only if the price is greater than the price we are willing to pay for it. This implies that the indifference curves should designate a reference point...