We propose the "average approach," where the worth of a coalition is a weighted average of its worth for different …

We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game …) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable … which the bidders' final utility possibly depends on the winner's identity. We show that such direct externalities offer a …

policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … joining the IEA set emissions to internalize some exogenously given fraction of the externalities that own emissions cause on … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …

policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … joining the IEA set emissions to internalize some exogenously given fraction of the externalities that own emissions cause on … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …

coalition with the agents who most desire, or least desire, the public good, and we may observe 'strange bedfellow' coalitions …