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This paper seeks to extend the domain of identity economics by exploring motivational foundations of in-group cooperation and out-group competition. On this basis, we explore the reflexive interaction between individual economic decisions and social identities in response to technological change...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434452
Intelligence and personality significantly affect social outcomes of individuals. We study how and why these traits affect the outcome of groups, looking specifically at how these characteristics operate in repeated interactions providing opportunity for profitable cooperation. Our experimental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011547729
Exchange of risks is considered here as a transferable-utility cooperative game. When the concerned agents are risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409137
In this paper we test empirically with the Nordhaus and Yang (1996) RICE model the core property of the transfer scheme adv ocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997). This scheme is designed to sustain full cooperation in a voluntary international environmental agreement by making all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781723
We explore the relationship between individuals' disposition to cooperate and their inclination to engage in peer punishment as well as their relative importance for mitigating social dilemmas. Using a novel strategy-method approach we identify individual punishment patterns and link them with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011587542
In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a “tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496893
We study how punishment influences conditional cooperation. We ask two questions: 1) how does conditional cooperation change if a subject can be punished and 2) how does conditional cooperation change if a subject has the power to punish others. In particular, we disentangle the decision to be a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864590
We construct a general equilibrium model of a two-country trading block where governments through tax policies attract mobile capital, and provide an imported public consumption good. At Nash equilibrium, when the public good is under-provided, (i) a country with a large GDP, has a large Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011399347
This paper explores some cooperative aspects of investments in uncertain, real options. Key production factors are assumed transferable. They may reflect property or user rights. Emission of pollutants and harvest of renewable resources are cases in point. Of particular interest are alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011401340
This paper analyzes the setting of national patent policies in the global economy. In the standard model with free trade and social-welfare-maximizing governments à la Grossman and Lai (2004), cross-border positive policy externalities induce individual countries to select patent strengths that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009230883