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Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants
Hili, Amal; Laussel, Didier; Long, Ngo Van - 2016
We analyze the optimal contract between a risk-averse manager and the initial shareholders in a two-period model where the manager's investment effort, carried out in period 1, and her current effort, carried out in period 2, both impact the second-period profit, so that it may be difficult to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538964
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Do firms gain from managerial overconfidence? : the role of severance pay
Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - 2022
We analyze the effects of optimism and overconfidence when the manager's compensation package includes severance pay and the CEO has bargaining power. We find that optimism does not affect incentive pay but increases severance pay with a negative effect on profit. Overconfidence, on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013255972
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CEO compensation : evidence from the field
Edmans, Alex; Gosling, Tom; Jenter, Dirk - 2021
We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO pay. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avoid controversy on CEO pay, implying they face significant constraints other than participation and incentive compatibility. These constraints...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584217
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All hat and no cattle? : ESG incentives in executive compensation
Efing, Matthias; Ehmann, Stefanie; Kampkötter, Patrick; … - 2024
This paper examines the integration of ESG performance metrics into executive compensation using a detailed panel dataset of European executives. Despite becoming more widespread, most ESG metrics are largely discretionary, carry immaterial weights in payout calculations, and contribute little...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015077841
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Managerial hedging and portfolio monitoring
Bisin, Alberto (contributor); Gottardi, Piero (contributor);  … - 2004
Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and the cash flow of the firms they manage …. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence gives them an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002521243
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The diffusion of knowledge via manager's mobility
Mion, Giordano; Opromolla, Luca David; Sforza, Alessandro - 2016
Better managers and managerial practices lead to better firm performance. Yet, little is known about what happens when … managers move across firms. Does a firm hiring a good manager improve its performance? If yes is there some valuable knowledge …-invariant ability of the manager as well as overall firm performance. We find that the export experience gained by managers in previous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011580556
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The market for CEOs
Cziraki, Peter; Jenter, Dirk - 2021
We study the market for CEOs of large publicly-traded US firms, analyze new CEOs' prior connections to the hiring firm, and explore how hiring choices are determined. Firms are hiring from a surprisingly small pool of candidates. More than 80% of new CEOs are insiders, defined as current or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012546976
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Corporate deductibility provisions and managerial incentives
Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - 2013
findings suggest that, when managers engage in wasteful capital expenditures, welfare may decline if the cost of investment is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227267
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Management incentives under formula apportionment : tax-induced distortions of effort and compensation in a principal-agent setting
Martini, Jan T.; Niemann, Rainer; Simons, Dirk - 2014
compensation to managers in low-tax jurisdictions, if payroll enters the FA formula. Managers in high-tax jurisdictions face the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383849
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A theory of tax avoidance : managerial incentives for tax planning in a multi-task principal-agent model
Ewert, Ralf; Niemann, Rainer - 2014
We derive determinants of tax avoidance by means of a multi-task principal-agent model. We extend prevailing models by integrating both corporate and individual income taxation as well as by including tax planning effort in the agent’s action portfolio. Our model shows novel and apparently...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010367166