We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game …) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable …

This paper examines how neutral the current EU decision-making procedures are to membership and how well they obey …

In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how … of the prize often takes place after the coalition formation stage. This creates the possibility for some players to ask … strategic disadvantage: a greater voting power in forming a winning coalition is undermined by the threat of being overly …

countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset of the … parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The small stable … coalition is not very effective in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The ineffectiveness is …

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of … international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without … becoming coalition members themselves. Rather, their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, which …

policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … all members of the IEA. In the strong delegation game principals first delegate to agents, which then decide on membership … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …

with respect to both emissions and membership. In that encompassing IEA game the size of the coalition is increasing in the … Kantian moral behavior. Countries may behave morally with respect to both emissions (reduction) and membership in an IEA. If … countries are emissions Kantians or membership Kantians the outcome of the corresponding IEA games is socially optimal. To model …