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The literature on both entry deterrence and the influence of special interest groups is extensive. In this paper we attempt to marry these strands of literature by developing a model of entry deterrence through interest group influence in an entry re-regulation context. In contrast to other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539115
Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012491609
Recent adoption of competition laws across the globe has highlighted the importance of institutional considerations for antitrust effectiveness and the need for comparative institutional analyses of antitrust that extend beyond matters of substantive law. Contributing to the resulting nascent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011384564
on the influence of lobbying by both national firms and foreign multinationals on trade policies and the gains from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011482658
We study lobbying behavior by firms in a two-region economy, with either centralized or decentralized provision of … profit-enhancing local public goods. Firms compete either in the market, lobbying for public good provision once entered in a … market, or for the market, lobbying to gain ccess to it. When firms compete in the market, we show that lobbying is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509399
We propose a forensic approach to investigate the politico-economic forces that influence narrow vote outcomes in legislative assemblies. Applying nonparametric estimation techniques to a data set covering all roll call votes between 1990 and 2014, we can identify the existence of precise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509565
We construct a political equilibrium in which employers and labour unions bargain over labour contracts, wage-earners and profit-earners lobby the government for taxation and labour market regulation, and labour market legislation must be accepted by the majority of voters. We show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409824
democracy where citizens can lobby an elected policy-maker. We find that lobbying always matters. That is, lobbying always …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781567
We assess the influence of moneyed interests on legislative decisions. Our theory predicts that the vote outcome distribution and donation flows in a legislature feature a discontinuity at the approval threshold of bills if special interest groups are involved in vote buying. Testing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012103631
In this paper we examine the empirical relevance of three prominent endogenous protection models. Is protection for sale, or do altruistic policy makers worry about political support? We find strong evidence that protection is indeed for sale. The important new result is, however, that not only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397792