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Lang, Matthias - 2014

Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. If she does not provide justification, her message space is restricted, but the message is costless. I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361447

Disclosure deregulation of quarterly reporting

Behrmann, Vanessa; Hornuf, Lars; Zimmermann, Jochen - 2021 - This version: October 5, 2021

Directive into German law and analyze whether a reduction in the minimum content requirements for quarterly reporting increases …, our results reveal that over the period from 2012 to 2019, lower quarterly reporting levels on average have increased … coverage. Our results are robust to potential selection effects regarding firms’ choice of quarterly reporting content levels. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012643524

The effects of a bonus tax on manager compensation and welfare

Radulescu, Doina - 2010

managers between countries whereas in the second scenario relocation possibilities exist. Our findings show that the effort …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965889

The efficiency costs of dividend taxation with managerial firms : presented at CESifo Area Conference on Public Sector Economics, April 2015

Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - 2015

The paper analyzes the efficiency costs of dividend taxation in an effort-based corporate agency model in which non-verifiable managerial effort enhances taxable profits. We show that investment changes following a rise in dividend taxes might not be sufficient to infer the efficiency cost of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374208

CEO preferences and acquisitions

Jenter, Dirk; Lewellen, Katharina - 2011

This paper explores the impact of target CEOs' retirement preferences on the incidence, the pricing, and the outcomes of takeover bids. Mergers frequently force target CEOs to retire early, and CEOs' private merger costs are the forgone benefits of staying employed until the planned retirement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009412377

Corporate deductibility provisions and managerial incentives

Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - 2013

findings suggest that, when managers engage in wasteful capital expenditures, welfare may decline if the cost of investment is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227267

Management incentives under formula apportionment : tax-induced distortions of effort and compensation in a principal-agent setting

Martini, Jan T.; Niemann, Rainer; Simons, Dirk - 2014

management decisions are influenced by principal agent relationships. How FA affects the demand for managerial effort is a … compensation to managers in low-tax jurisdictions, if payroll enters the FA formula. Managers in high-tax jurisdictions face the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383849

A theory of tax avoidance : managerial incentives for tax planning in a multi-task principal-agent model

Ewert, Ralf; Niemann, Rainer - 2014

We derive determinants of tax avoidance by means of a multi-task principal-agent model. We extend prevailing models by integrating both corporate and individual income taxation as well as by including tax planning effort in the agent’s action portfolio. Our model shows novel and apparently...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010367166

Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants

Hili, Amal; Laussel, Didier; Long, Ngo Van - 2016

We analyze the optimal contract between a risk-averse manager and the initial shareholders in a two-period model where the manager's investment effort, carried out in period 1, and her current effort, carried out in period 2, both impact the second-period profit, so that it may be difficult to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538964

Yes, managers should be paid like bureaucrats

Frey, Bruno S. (contributor); Osterloh, Margit (contributor) - 2005

Corporate scandals, reflected in excessive management compensation and fraudulent accounts, cause considerable damage …. Agency theory’s insistence on linking the compensation of managers and directors as closely as possible to firm performance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002572375

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