A two-tier climate club exploits the comparative advantage of large countries to mete out punishments through trade, while taking their capacity to resist punishment as a constraint. Countries outside the coalition price carbon at a fixed fraction of the average carbon price adopted within the...

This paper describes a model, implemented in an Excel spreadsheet, for evaluating a wide range of fiscal and regulatory instruments policymakers might consider for implementing their Paris mitigation pledges. Policies are evaluated against a range of metrics, including impacts on carbon dioxide...

We study adaptation to climate change in a federalist setting. To protect themselves against an increase in flood risk, regional governments choose among adaptation measures that vary with respect to their costs, the level of protection they offer, and the presence and nature of spillovers to...

We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select...

For any emission trading system (ETS) with quantity-based endogenous supply of allowances, there exists a negative demand shock, e.g. induced by abatement policy, that increases aggregate supply and thus cumulative emissions. We prove this green paradox for a general model and then apply it to...

With the new rules of the EU ETS, involving cancellation of allowances, cumulative emissions are no longer fixed but depending on the market outcome. Perino (2018) showed that additional abatement effort can reduce cumulative emissions if it occurs within a few years. This article shows that...

If a coalition of countries implements climate policies, nonparticipants tend to consume more, pollute more, and invest too little in renewable energy sources. In response, the coalition's equilibrium policy distorts trade and it is not time consistent. By adding a market for the right to...

We study optimal climate policy for a "policy bloc" of countries facing a market where emissions offsets can be purchased from a non-policy "fringe" of countries (such as for the CDM). Policy-bloc firms benefit from free quota allocations whose quantity is updated according to firms' past...

This paper calculates, for the top twenty emitting countries, how much pricing of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions is in their own national interests due to domestic co-benefits. On average, nationally efficient prices are substantial, $ 57.5 per ton of CO2 (for year 2010), reflecting primarily...