Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 1,811
Cover Image
The efficiency costs of dividend taxation with managerial firms : presented at CESifo Area Conference on Public Sector Economics, April 2015
Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - 2015
The paper analyzes the efficiency costs of dividend taxation in an effort-based corporate agency model in which non …-verifiable managerial effort enhances taxable profits. We show that investment changes following a rise in dividend taxes might not be … sufficient to infer the efficiency cost of dividend taxation as well as the financing regime of the firm that underlies the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374208
Cover Image
Incentive contracts and efficient unemployment benefits
Demougin, Dominique; Helm, Carsten - 2009
Several European countries have reformed their labor market institutions. Incentive effects of unemployment benefits have been an important aspect of these reforms. We analyze this issue in a principal-agent model, focusing on unemployment levels and labor productivity. In our model, a higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850266
Cover Image
Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections
Gersbach, Hans - 2001
When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397764
Cover Image
Common agency equilibria with discrete mechanisms and discrete types
Martimort, David; Stole, Lars A. - 2001
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agencygame with discrete types and direct revelation mechanisms. After presentinga general algorithm to find the pure-strategy equilibria of this game, we use itto characterize these equilibria when the two principals control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400396
Cover Image
Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information
Malcomson, James M. - 2015 - This version: July 24, 2015
This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with continuous, privately-observed agent types that are persistent over time. With fixed agent types, full separation is not possible when continuation equilibrium payoffs following revelation are on the Pareto frontier of attainable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011300994
Cover Image
Information transmission and ownership consolidation in aid programs
Dreher, Axel; Marchesi, Silvia - 2013
This paper explores the role of information transmission in explaining donors ́choice between project aid and budget support. Budget support increases the involvement of recipient governments in the decision-making process and can thus be an example of a "delegation-scheme." Conversely, project...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010199746
Cover Image
Information transmission within federal fiscal architectures : theory and evidence
Gehring, Kai; Kotsogiannēs, Chrēstos; Marchesi, Silvia - 2013
This paper explores the role of information transmission and misaligned interests across levels of government in explaining variation in the degree of decentralization across countries. Within a two-sided incomplete information principal-agent framework, it analyzes two alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010126407
Cover Image
Optimal contracting with endogenous project mission
Cassar, Lea - 2016
I analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent and can influence the agent’s marginal return of effort by the choice of the project mission. The principal's and the agents' mission preferences are misaligned, and the agents have unobservable intrinsic motivation levels. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011561184
Cover Image
Sharing budgetary austerity under free mobility and asymmetric information : an optimal regulation approach to fiscal federalism
Breuillé, Marie-Laure (contributor);  … - 2005
In the present article, Tiebout meets Laffont and Tirole in the land of Fiscal Federalism. We use a non-trivial Principal-Multi-Agent model to characterize the optimal intergovernmental grant schedule, when the cost of local public goods depends on hidden characteristics and actions of local...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003202118
Cover Image
Advantageous selection without moral hazard (with an application to life care annuities)
De Donder, Philippe; Leroux, Marie-Louise; Salanié, … - 2022
show that profit-maximization implies that advantageous selection is more likely when markup rates and the elasticity of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013205047