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Efficiency and labor market dynamics in a model of labor selection

Chugh, Sanjay K.; Merkl, Christian - 2015 - First draft: September 2010, This draft: August 9, 2015

This paper characterizes efficient labor-market allocations in a labor selection model. The model's crucial aspect is cross-sectional heterogeneity for new job contacts, which leads to an endogenous selection threshold for new hires. With cross-sectional dispersion calibrated to microeconomic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011306109

Term length and the quality of appointments

Glazer, Amihai; Kanniainen, Vesa - 2000

Consider a principal who appoints an agent. Let the agent potentially serve for a sufficiently long time that one principal is replaced by another over this period. Suppose also that the quality of the agent appointed increases with the effort the incumbent principal devotes to hiring. Then the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009786719

Delegation in hiring : evidence from a two-sided audit

Cowgill, Bo; Perkowski, Patryk - 2024

Firms increasingly delegate job screening to third-party recruiters, who must not only satisfy employers’ demand for different types of candidates, but also manage yield by anticipating candidates’ likelihood of accepting offers. We study how recruiters balance these objectives in a novel,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014543833

Aversion to hiring algorithms : transparency, gender profiling, and self-confidence

Dargnies, Marie-Pierre; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, … - 2022

We run an online experiment to study the origins of algorithm aversion. Participants are either in the role of workers or of managers. Workers perform three real-effort tasks: task 1, task 2, and the job task which is a combination of tasks 1 and 2. They choose whether the hiring decision...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013383463

Labour costs and the decision to hire the first employee

Cockx, Bart; Desiere, Sam - 2023

Firms without paid employees account for up to 80% of all firms, but only a small minority ever hires. This paper investigates the relationship between labour costs and the decision to hire a first employee and become an employer. Leveraging a unique policy in Belgium that permanently reduced...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014280092

Interview sequences and the formation of subjective assessments

Radbruch, Jonas; Schiprowski, Amelie - 2024

Interviewing is a decisive stage of most processes that match candidates to firms and organizations. This paper studies how and why a candidate's interview outcome depends on the other candidates interviewed by the same evaluator. We use large-scale data from high-stakes admission and hiring...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478276

Explicit and implicit belief-based gender discrimination : a hiring experiment

Barron, Kai; Ditlmann, Ruth; Gehrig, Stefan; … - 2022

Understanding discrimination is key for designing policy interventions that promote equality in society. Economists have studied the topic intensively, typically taxonomizing discrimination as either taste-based or (accurate) statistical discrimination. To reveal the limitations of this taxonomy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013186866

Betting on diversity : occupational segregation and gender stereotypes

Fischbacher, Urs; Kübler, Dorothea; Stüber, Robert - 2022

Many occupations and industries are highly segregated with respect to gender. This segregation could be due to perceived job-specific productivity differences between men and women. It could also result from the belief that single-gender teams perform better. We investigate the two explanations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013482205

Political alignment and bureaucratic pay

Fiva, Jon H.; Geys, Benny; Heggedal, Tom-Reiel; … - 2019

We study the private gains to bureaucrats from their political alignment with elected politicians. Whereas existing studies generally rely on proxies for politician-bureaucrat political alignment, a rare feature of our data allows measuring it directly since 27% of bureaucrats ran for political...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012119821

Delegating recruitment under asymmetric information

Sengupta, Sarbajit - 2002

Recruitment is often delegated to senior employees. Delegated recruitment, however, is vulnerable to moral hazard … relates to the candidates type . Delegation is then superior to direct (owner) recruitment and offering tenure or guaranteed … seniority to the senior employee is neither always desirable for the owner nor necessary to ensure good recruitment. If there is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514022

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