A general framework is described specifying how boundedly rational decision makers generate their choices. Starting from a "Master Module" which keeps an inventory of previously successful and unsuccessful routines several submodules can be called forth which either allow one to adjust behavior...

This paper deals with a Niskanen type of public-procurement agency. It is shown that the procurement game should be separated into an investment game and a project game, the first game to be played before nature determines the actual realizations of benefit and costs of the project, the second...

Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules,...

By vetoing one questions mutually efficient agreements. On the other hand the threat of vetoing may prevent exploitation. Based on a generalization of ultimatum bargaining (Suleiman, 1996) we first elicit the responders' certainty equivalents for three different degrees of veto power. Afterwards...

In public procurement a temporal separation of award and actual contracting can frequently be observed. In this paper the authors give an explanation for this institutional setting. For incomplete procurement contracts they show that such may increase efficiency. They show that efficiency can be...

Making use of restrictions imposed by equilibrium, theoretical progress has been made on the nonparametric and semiparametric estimation and identification of scalar additive hedonic models (Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim, 2002) and scalar nonadditive hedonic models (Heckman, Matzkin, and...

This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the...

This paper considers the identification and estimation of hedonic models. We establish that in an additive version of the hedonic model, technology and preferences are generically identified up to affine transformations from data on demand and supply in a single hedonic market. For a very...

Endogenous timing can help to derive the time structure of decision making instead of assuming it as exogenously given. In our study we consider a homogeneous market where, like in the model of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), sellers determine "sales capacities" before prices. Sellers must serve...