A general framework is described specifying how boundedly rational decision makers generate their choices. Starting from a "Master Module" which keeps an inventory of previously successful and unsuccessful routines several submodules can be called forth which either allow one to adjust behavior...

We consider taxation by a Leviathan government and by a utilitarian government in the presence of heterogenous locations within a country, when migration from one country to another is and is not possible. In a closed economy, a utilitarian government may transfer income from the poor to the...

We consider a firm that is subject to employment protection laws that limit the firm's ability to fire labor. In particular, we suppose that though a firm which shuts down can fire all its workers, it may fire no fewer. Compared to a firm that is subject to no employment protection, a firm...

We consider duopolists innovating and producing a good subject to network externalities, so that the reservation price of a consumer increases with aggregate consumption. The post-innovation network consists of two compatible sub-networks, with increased network valuation of the new product....

Reduced inequality in human capital may reduce approriation from the rich. They may therefore favor policies such as income transfer and mandatory schooling leads to higher incomes for boththe rich and the poor, and increases the welfare of all. Moreover, it is the optimal policy for the rich,...

Consider a public project which produces a consumption good and which benefits ruture generations. Let a conventional cost-benefit analysis find that it gives higher benefits than projects it would dis-place in the private sector. Voters may nevertheless oppose the public project: the...

Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules,...

Consider a principal who appoints an agent. Let the agent potentially serve for a sufficiently long time that one principal is replaced by another over this period. Suppose also that the quality of the agent appointed increases with the effort the incumbent principal devotes to hiring. Then the...

By vetoing one questions mutually efficient agreements. On the other hand the threat of vetoing may prevent exploitation. Based on a generalization of ultimatum bargaining (Suleiman, 1996) we first elicit the responders' certainty equivalents for three different degrees of veto power. Afterwards...

Making use of restrictions imposed by equilibrium, theoretical progress has been made on the nonparametric and semiparametric estimation and identification of scalar additive hedonic models (Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim, 2002) and scalar nonadditive hedonic models (Heckman, Matzkin, and...