We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount of...

This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct externalities between principals both under complete and asymetric information. Direct externalities arise when the contracting variable of one principal affects directly the other pricipal`s payoff....

In the context of common agency adverse-selection games we illustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to study equilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate that an extension of the taxation pricipal - what we term the "delegation priciple" - can be used to...

This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with discrete types and direct revelation mechanisms. After presenting a general algorithm to find the pure -strategy equilibria of this game, we use it to characterize these equilibria when the two principals...