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This paper extends the job market signaling model of Spence (1973) by allowing firms to learn the ability of their … select a unique separating equilibrium. When the Intuitive Criterion bites and information is purely asymmetric, the …
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incorporating a limited amount of information from the demand side of the market, we are able to obtain credible and precise …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261648
on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to … ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act … one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462472
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We show that in a search/matching model with endogenous participation in which workers are heterogeneous with respect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269110
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This paper presents a model in which firms recruit both unemployed and employed workers by posting vacancies. Firms act monopsonistically and set wages to retain their existing workers as well as to attract new ones. The model differs from Burdett and Mortensen (1998) in that its assumptions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464892
This paper develops a dynamic model of mismatch. Workers and jobs are randomly assigned to labor markets. Each labor market clears at each instant but some labor markets have more workers than jobs, hence unemployment, and some have more jobs than workers, hence vacancies. As workers and jobs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466783