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Contractual relations between European VC-funds and investors: The impact of reputation and bargaining power on contractual design

Schmidt, Daniel; Wahrenburg, Mark - 2003

explore the effects of venture capital supply on contract design. Gompers and Lerner (1996) show that VC-funds in the US are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010298250

Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment

Krueger, Dirk; Uhlig, Harald - 2005

given period, after having observed her income, the agent can walk away from the contract, while the intermediary cannot, i … can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up-front payment e.ectively locks in the agent with an intermediary …. We then show that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption-savings economy with one-period Arrow securities …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010298298

Venture capital exit rights

Bienz, Carsten; Walz, Uwe - 2008

Theorists argue that exit rights can mitigate hold-up problems in venture capital. Using a hand-collected data-set of venture capital contracts from Germany we show that exit rights are included more frequently in venture capital contracts when a hold-up problem associated with the venture...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010303713

Governance und Vertragsstrukturen in der deutschen VC Industrie: Eine empirische Einschätzung

Bienz, Carsten; Hirsch, Julia; Walz, Uwe - 2008

Diese Arbeit analysiert die wesentlichen Elemente der Vertragsstrukturen in der Venture Capital-Industrie. Aufbauend auf einem sehr umfangreichen und detaillierten Datensatz, der die Verträge zwischen Venture Capital-Investoren und deren Portfoliounternehmen abbildet, werden die Kontroll-,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010303722