Showing 1 - 10 of 12
The paper considers tacit collusion in markets which are not fully transparent on both sides. Consumers only detect prices with some probability before deciding which fi?rm to purchase from, and each fi?rm only detects the other fi?rm's price with some probability. Increasing transparency on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087411
This paper considers entry into a market with two incumbents where one prefers and one dislikes entry. Unlike the entrant both incumbents know market demand. One would like to signal high demand, the other low. In separating equilibria incumbents choose full information Nash-equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005543427
We show that the fact that farmers in a cooperative individually decide how much to supply to cooperative may serve as a commitment device for credibility (and profitably) gaining market share in competition with a profit maximizing firm.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005543434
In a Hotelling market with endogenous choice of product characteristics increasing market transparency on the consumer side leads to less product differentiation, and lower prices and profits. This is welfare improving for all consumers and total surplus increases.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749380
We investigate the choice of market variable, price or quantity, of an optimal implicit cartel. If the discount factor is high, the cartel can realize the monopoly profit in both cases. Otherwise, it is optimal for the cartel to rely on quantities in the collusive phase if goods are substitutes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749382
This paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side as well as on the producer side of a market. Increasing market transparency on the consumer side, increases the benefits to a firm from undercutting the collusive price. It also decreases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749388
In several European merger cases competition authorities have demanded that the merging firm auctions of virtual capacity. The buyer of virtual capacity receives an option on an amount of output at a pre-specified price, typically equal to marginal cost. This output is sold in the market in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749393
We study the long run e¤ects of transparency in a circular town model of a differentiated market. The market is not fully transparent on the consumer side: A fraction of consumers are uninformed about prices. Increasing transparency reduces the equilibrium price, profit and entry of firms. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749430
We make a positive analysis of the impact of market structure and political preferences on a (local) government's decision to outsource public service using the framework of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997). We argue that although outsourcing is more attractive when the privte market is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749440
This paper considers the effect of monopoly-promoting export cartels on domestic production. It is argued that export cartels facilitate tacit collusion by monitoring defections more efficiently. This slackesn the incentive constraint of tacit collusion. Optimizing firms competing both in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749446