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Multi-Period Dea Incentive Regulation in Electricity Distribution.

Agrell, Per J.; Bogetoft, Peter; Tind, Jørgen - Centre for Industrial Economics (CIE), Økonomisk Institut - 2000

demonstrate considerable advantages compared to the popular CPI-X revenue cap regulation. The schemes avoid arbitrariness, too …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749423

Generating Efficiency: Economic and Environmental Regulation of Public and Private Electricity Generators in Spain

Arocena, Pablo; Price, Catherine Waddams - Centre for Industrial Economics (CIE), Økonomisk Institut - 1999

Economic regulation of firms with market power has placed increasing emphasis on incentive-based regulation such as … price caps. We focus on the effect of regulation as distinct from ownership, and identify the effect of two different … efficient under cost of service regulation; private (but not public) firms responded to incentive regulation by increasing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749419

Restructuring Electricity Markets when Demand is Uncertain: Effects on Capacity Investments, Prices and Welfare

Boom, Anette; Buehler, Stefan - Centre for Industrial Economics (CIE), Økonomisk Institut - 2007

We examine the effects of restructuring electricity markets on capacity investments, retail prices and welfare when demand is uncertain. We study the following market configurations: (i) integrated monopoly, (ii) integrated duopoly with wholesale trade, and (iii) separated duopoly with wholesale...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749411

Strategic and Welfare Implications of Bundling

Martin, Stephen - Centre for Industrial Economics (CIE), Økonomisk Institut - 1998

A standard oligopoly model of bundling shows that bundling by a firm with a monopoly over one product has a strategic effect because it changes the substitution relationships between the goods among which consumers choose. Bundling in appropriate proportions is privately profitable, reduces...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005232970

Exclusive Safeguards and Technology Transfer: Subcontracting Agreements in Eastern Europe's Car Component Industry.

Møllgaard, H. Peter; Lorentzen, Jochen - Centre for Industrial Economics (CIE), Økonomisk Institut - 2002

We study the rationale for the use of exclusivity to protect transfer of technology in subcontracting agreements. The legal possibility arises through the EU Notice on Subcontracting. Empirically, the link between exclusive agreements and technology transfer among firms in the automotive supply...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005818461

Competition Compliance: Limits to Competition Policy Harmonisation in EU Enlargement

Lorentzen, Jochen; Møllgaard, H. Peter - Centre for Industrial Economics (CIE), Økonomisk Institut - 2002

The paper analyses the extent of and the reasons behind limits to competition policy harmonisation in EU enlargement. Our focus is on vertical restraints. First, we compare the relevant legal regimes towards vertical agreements in the EU and in Eastern Europe. We then describe competition policy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005543421

Auditing Cost Overrun Claims

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Riedinger, Nicolas - Centre for Industrial Economics (CIE), Økonomisk Institut - 1999

We consider a cost-reimbursement or a cost-sharing procurement contract between the administration and a firm. The firm privately learns the true cost overrun once the project has started and it can manipulate this information. We characterize the optimal auditing policy of cost overrun claims...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749415

Signaling and rent extraction vis contract proposals in franchising

Albæk, Svend; Overgaard, Per Baltzer - Centre for Industrial Economics (CIE), Økonomisk Institut - 1998

We study the role of two-part transfer schemes as signals of consumer demand from a privately informed franchisor to an uninformed franchisee. Distortions in the wholesale price and the up-front franchise fee offered by the high demand franchisor may possibly separate the different types of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749397

Network Structure and Entry, in the Deregulated Airline Industry

Berechman, Joseph; Poddar, Sougata; Shy, Oz - Centre for Industrial Economics (CIE), Økonomisk Institut - 1997

We explore how an incumbent airline firm structures its route network under the threat of entry caused by deregulation. We show that entry induces the incumbent firm to strategically alter its flight operating network from a fully connected network (FC) to a hub-and-spoke network (HS). While...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749412

Cooperation in International Banking Supervision

Holthausen, Cornelia; Rønde, Thomas - Centre for Industrial Economics (CIE), Økonomisk Institut - 2003

This paper analyzes cooperation between sovereign national authorities in the supervision and regulation of a … multinational bank. We take a political economy approach to regulation and assume that supervisors maximize the welfare of their own … the countries are perfectly aligned, first best closure regulation cannot be implemented; (2) the more aligned the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749443