Antitrust policy involves not just the regulation of anti-competitive behavior, but also an important deterrence effect. Neither scholars nor policymakers have fully researched the deterrence effects of merger policy tools, as they have been unable to empirically measure these effects. We...

Motivated by the general lack of empirical scholarship concerning the cross-national environment for competition policy, I present measures here of the overall resources dedicated to competition policy and the merger policy work-load for thirty-two antitrust jurisdictions over the 1992-2007...

We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves...

Consider the intertemporal volatility of the number of firms and establishments within an industry over a relatively long span of time. Data from the U.S. manufacturing sector shows that this degree of endemic volatility varies widely across industries. Examining the determinants of this...

I study Cournot competition under incomplete information about demand while assuming that market price must be non-negative for all demand realizations. Although this assumption is very natural, it has only rarely been made in the earlier literature. Yet it has important economic consequences:...

The much-studied relationship between domestic rivalry and export performance consists of those supporting a national-champion rationale, and those supporting a rivalry rationale. While the empirical literature generally supports the positive effects of domestic rivalry, the national-champion...

This paper provides a conceptual framework of multilateral bargaining in a bilaterally oligopolistic industry to analyze the motivations for horizontal mergers, technology choice, and their welfare implications. We first analyze the implication of market structure for the distribution of...

The recent 'open-economy industrial organization' literature generally finds export-orientation to enhance the weight of post-merger international competitive gains; thereby, favoring lenient domestic merger policy. We observe, however, that mergers seldom generate the ‘significant...

We study the incentives of Cournot oligopolists to acquire and disclose information on a common cost (or demand) parameter. Since information acquisition is such that firms may fail to acquire information, firms can credibly conceal unfavorable news while disclosing favorable news. This paper...

The literature on antitrust in an open-economy setting is inconclusive with respect to the role played by trade-balance on the tenor of domestic merger policy. Using a panel data set composed of US merger reviews by industrial sector over the 1997-2001 period, I empirically test the impact of...