We develop a model in which political parties but not voters are informed about which policies induce the optimal outcome for the voters. Policies can be located on the real life. Parties are policy-oriented, and have polarized preferences, i.e., any leftward move of the implemented policy is...

This paper explicitly considers strategic interaction between governments to study currency competition and its effects on the circulation of currencies and welfare in a two-country, two-currency search theoretic model. Each government uses seigniorage to provide public goods. Agents consume...

This paper presents a two-country model in which two currencies compete with each other. There exists an equilibrium in which the two currencies with different rates of inflation circulate as media of exchange despite that neither currency is forced to be used for transactions. Taxes payable in...

This paper considers an infinitely repeated economy in which divisible fiat money is used to trade goods. The economy has many market places. In each period, each agent chooses a market place, randomly meets someone who comes to the same market place, and they trade their goods when both agree...

We examine a dictator game with a "voice" option in the laboratory. In our experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for the minimum acceptable offer before the dictator dictates his/her offer. In this game, it is predicted not only by the standard game...

We use the framework of random matching games and develop a two society model to analyze the interaction of societies with different social norms. Each agent repeatedly faces two different coordination games. A social norm of a society is a mode of behavior --strategy--which is adopted by a...