We consider a market in which a public firm competes against private ones, and ask what happens when the public firm is privatized. In the short run, privatization is harmful because prices rise: the disciplinary role of the public firm is lost. In the long run, privatization leads to further...

We model firm pricing given consumers follow simple reservation price rules. Such reservation rules are rational when consumers are sufficiently impatient. The equilibrium exhibits price dispersion in pure strategies, with lower price firms earning higher profits. The range of price dispersion...

This paper considers the interaction between a firm and trade union in determining employment, wages and capital stock. We take the monopoly trade union model of Oswald (1982), where the union sets the wage, and add the firms choice of capital stock. The standard predictions of the union...

This paper has two objectives. First, we present the logit model of discrete consumer choice and apply it to an oligopoly model of product differentiation. Second, we reconsider the question of monopolistic competition and optimal product diversity. The model suggests that when the market...

This paper develops a model where two competing firms on a bounded line each sell two products. Production costs are lower for each firm the closer are its two products. There are three possible equilibria which may entail market segmentation, market interlacing or an intermediate case.