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How to share joint liability: a cooperative game approach

DEHEZ, Pierre; FEREY, Samuel - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2012

define a transferable utility game whose core defines fair judgments. We show that weighted Shapley values define fair …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610447

Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey

FORGES, Françoise; MINELLI, Enrico; VOHRA, Rajiv - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001

This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymetric information …. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and the interim stage.The analysis includes … issues of non emptiness of the core as wellas core convergence to price equilibrium allocations. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008294

Ratio equilibria and voting in a public goods economy with jurisdictions

CURRARINI, Sergio - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1996

a public goods economy to the core of a strong voting game. This paper extends in two ways Kaneko's analysis to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008579

On efficiency and sustainability in a collective decision-making problem with heterogeneous agents

HAIMANKO, Ori; LE BRETON, Michel; WEBER, Shlomo - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2002

In this paper we examine a collective decision problem, where the set of heterogeneous individuals is partitioned into several groups, each choosing its own policy (e.g., location of a public project) from the given policy space. We first consider the notion of "efficient" partition that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008591

Invariance with respect to re-evaluations of coalitional power

de CLIPPEL, Geoffroy - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003

with respect to re-evaluations of coalitional power' (IRCP) allows to characterize the core as the largest solution … characterize the inner core for NTU games with convex and smooth feasible sets. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043363

The [gamma]-core and coalition formation

CHANDER, Parkash - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003

This paper reinterprets by [gamma]-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043417

The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects

FORGES, Françoise; MERTENS, Jean-François; VOHRA, Rajiv - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001

incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically non-empty. However, we exhibit a wellbehaved … exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043580

Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods

dEHEZ, Pierre - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2010

A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good. Each member is capable of providing it at a certain cost and the solution is to rely on the player who can do it at the lowest cost. It is then natural that he or she be compensated by the other players. The question is to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642230

Allocation rules for coalitional network games

CAULIER, Jean-François; MAULEON, Ana; VANNETELBOSCH, … - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2013

Coalitional network games are real-valued functions defined on a set of players organized into a network and a coalition structure. We adopt a flexible approach assuming that players organize themselves the best way possible by forming the efficient coalitional network structure. We propose two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927690

The axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from bundled pricing

BERGANTINOS, Gustavo; MORENO-TERNERO, Juan - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2014

We explore in this paper the axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from bundled pricing. We formalize two models for this problem on the grounds of two different informational bases. In both models, we provide axiomatic rationale for natural rules to solve the problem. We,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011228292