The asset market is incomplete. Fix-price equilibria exist. Price regulation Pareto improves on a competitive allocation.

We propose a new concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set, in order to predict which networks may be formed among farsighted players. A set of networks G is pairto a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well wise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible...

We reconsider the well-known result of Arrow (1953) that the set of equilibria of an economy with complete markets coincides with the one of an economy with sequentially complete markets. We show by means of two examples that this result is problematic when there exist multiple equilibrium...

At arbitrary prices of commodities and assets, fix-price equilibria exist under weak assumptions: endowments need not satisfy an interiority condition, utility functions need only satisfy very weak monotonicity requirement, and the asset return matrix allows for redundant assets. Prices of...

We consider a non–cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action–dependent bargaining protocol, that is, the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected. An important example is the...