We study direct democracy with population uncertainty. Voters’ participation is often among the desiderata by the election designer. We show that with a participation quorum, i.e. a threshold on the fraction of participating voters below which the status quo is kept, the status quo may be kept...

This paper provides a methodology to study coalition formation problems with externalities and heterogeneous players, when some subset of the players can act as “coalition developers” over time. The framework provided here allows to explicitly predict the timing of admission to coalitions,...

In this paper we provide a cooperative solution as well as a non-cooperative analysis to study coalition formation and payoff distribution in weighted majority games. The cooperative solu- tion concept proposed here, the Anonymous Core, keeps the spirit of Core-like competition (reflecting...

The adoption of gender quotas inpart y lists has beena voluntary decision by many parties in many countries, and is now a subject of discussioninman y others. The Parity Low passed inF rance in 2001 is particularly interesting because for the first time the quota was set at 50 percent, and the...

This paper introduces a general equilibrium, overlapping generations model of the principal- agent problem. Bargaining power, occupational choice, and the returns to each occupation are endogenous. Individuals live for two periods and must work when young. When old, they have a choice between...