Dans cet article, nous étudions l’impact des différences de longévité sur la conception des politiques publiques, en particulier celles liées au départ à la retraite. Nous montrons premièrement qu’alors même que l’espérance de vie a augmenté de manière très importante tout au...

We develop a model where individuals all have the same probability of becoming dependent and vote over the social long term care insurance contribution rate before buying additional private insurance and saving. We study three types of behavioral biases, all having in common that agents...

This paper studies how congestion in the public health sector can be used as a redistributive tool. In our model, agents differ in income and they can obtain a health service either from a congested public hospital or from a non congested private one at a higher price. With pure in-kind...

A premature death unexpectedly brings a life and a career to their end, leading to substantial welfare losses. We study the retirement decision in an economy with risky lifetime, and compare the laissez-faire with egalitarian social optima. We consider two social objectives: (1) the maximin on...

This paper shows how the role of the market, the state and the family in providing financial support at old age has evolved over time with changes in factors such as the reliability and the effectiveness of family support, the rate of interest, the cost of public funds and earning inequality. We...

This paper studies the normative problem of redistribution among individuals who can influence their longevity through a non-monetary effort but have different taste for effort. As benchmarks, we first present the laissez-faire and the first best. In the first best, the level of effort is always...

Existing political economy models of pensions focus on age and productivity. In this paper we incorporate two additional individual characteristics: sex and marital status. We ignore the role of age, by assuming that people vote at the start of their life, and characterize the preferred rate of...

In an overlapping generations economy setup we show that, if individuals can improve their life expectancy by exerting some effort, costly in terms of either resources or utility, the competitive equilibrium steady state differs from the first best steady state. This is due to the fact that...

This paper studies the design of the optimal non linear taxation in an economy where longevity varies across agents, and depends on three factors: longevity genes, health investment and farsightedness. Provided earnings, farsightedness and genes are correlated, governmental intervention can be...

This paper studies the normative problem of redistribution between agents who can influence their survival probability through private health spending, but who differ in their attitude towards the risks involved in the lotteries of life to be chosen. For that purpose, we develop a two-period...