Similar Search Results

Stable and efficient coalitional networks

CAULIER, Jean-François; MAULEON, Ana; … - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2011

strong stability and of contractual stability. Contractual stability imposes that any change made to the coalitional network … members under the simple majority or unanimity decision rule may help to reconcile stability and effiency. Moreover, this new …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610449

Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation

CARAYOL, Nicolas; DELILLE, Rémy; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2014

We propose a concept to study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted and allocations …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752809

Connections among farsighted agents

GANDJEAN, Gilles; MAULEON, Ana; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550182

Farsightedly stable networks

HERINGS, Jean-Jacques; MAULEON, Ana; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2006

We propose a new concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set, in order to predict which networks may be formed among farsighted players. A set of networks G is pairto a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well wise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005065469

Risk-sharing networks and farsighted stability

GRANDJEAN, Gilles - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2011

particular, we study whether the farsightedness of the agents leads to a reduction of the tension between stability and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009002074

Stability of networks under level-K farsightedness

HERINGS, P. Jean-Jacques; MAULEON, Ana; VANNETELBOSCH, … - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2014

stability. A set of networks GK is a level-K farsightedly stable set if three conditions are satisfied. First, external … that belong to closed cycles. Level-K farsighted stability leads to a refinement of G1 for generic allocation rules. We … level-K farsighted stability and efficiency of networks. We show the tractability of the concept by applying it to a model …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011094063

On Gale and Shapley ‘College admissions and stability of marriage’

GABSZEWICZ, Jean J.; GARCIA, Filomena; PAIS, Joana; … - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2008

couples is enriched by the arrival of new candidates to marriage. Afterwards, we discuss briefly how stability concepts can be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008260

Diffusion and contagion in networks with heterogeneous agents and homophily

JACKSON, Matthew O.; LOPEZ-PINTADO, Dunia - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2012

We study how a behavior (an idea, buying a product, having a disease, adopting a cultural fad or a technology) spreads among agents in an a social network that exhibits segregation or homophily (the tendency of agents to associate with others similar to themselves). Individuals are distinguished...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927693

Oligopolistic competition with general complementarities

CALCIANO, Filippo L. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2011

In this paper we extend the basic model of Cournot competition to the case where both the demand function and the cost functions of each firm depend on the amounts produced by competitors. In this modified setting, proving existence of equilibria becomes harder. We develop a generalization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927703

Bargaining and delay in trading networks

BEDAYO, Mikel; MAULEON, Ana; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2012

We study a model in which heterogenous agents first form a trading network where link formation is costless. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We determine both the trading path and the allocation of the surplus among...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927733