This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymetric information …. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and the interim stage.The analysis includes … issues of non emptiness of the core as wellas core convergence to price equilibrium allocations. …

incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically non-empty. However, we exhibit a wellbehaved … exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms. …

structure and of the definition of the two game theoretical stability notions involved namely, core stability and internal … coalition nor for most large coalitions, it is nevertheless verified in a weak sense that involves transfers (dubbed "potential … internal stability") for most small coalitions. The reason for this difference is brought to light, namely the differing …

define a transferable utility game whose core defines fair judgments. We show that weighted Shapley values define fair …

a public goods economy to the core of a strong voting game. This paper extends in two ways Kaneko's analysis to …

If x is a reasonable agreement in a game V , then so should it remain in the associated game Vx where the coalitions … with respect to re-evaluations of coalitional power' (IRCP) allows to characterize the core as the largest solution … characterize the inner core for NTU games with convex and smooth feasible sets. …

This paper reinterprets by [gamma]-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction … that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions … coalitions)and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation …

compared in this paper with the solutions with the property of ?-core stability. Key instruments for that comparison are the … as they result from unacceptable, i.e. unstable imputations. The relation between internal and core stable solutions is … exist. But this class of games is more restricted than the one for which only ?-core solutions exist. The argument is first …