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Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners

MARINUCCI, Marco - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2008

This paper faces two questions concerning Joint Ventures (JV) agreements. First, we study how the partners contribution affect the creation and the profit sharing of a JV when partners' effort is not observable. Then, we see whether such agreements are easier to enforce when the decision on JV...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008158

Merger performance under uncertain efficiency gains

AMIR, Rabah; DIAMANTOUDI, Effrosyni; XUE, Licun - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003

are shown to follow similar threshold rules. The findings are broadly consistent with stylized facts. An extensive welfare … welfare standards. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008456

Market games and successive oligopolies

GABSZEWICZ, Jean J.; LAUSSEL, Didier; VAN YPERSELE, Tanguy - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2007

This paper first introduces an approach relying on market games to examine how successive oligopolies do operate between downstream and upstream markets. This approach is then compared with the traditional analysis of oligopolistic interaction in successive markets. The market outcomes resulting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008556

Successive oligopolies and decreasing returns

GABSZEWICZ, Jean J.; ZANAJ, Skerdilajda - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2008

In this paper, we propose an example of successive oligopolies where the downstream firms share the same decreasing returns technology of the Cobb-Douglas type. We stress the differences between the conclusions obtained under this assumption and those resulting from the traditional example...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042825

Efficiency gains and mergers

DE FEO, Giuseppe - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2008

Farrell and Shapiro (1990), is that (not too large) mergers that are profitable are always welfare improving. In the present … the welfare loss due to a price increase and overestimate the effect of efficiency gains. Then, we prove that the … conditions for welfare improving mergers defined by Farrell and Shapiro (1990) hold true only when consumers are adversely …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043008

Competition in successive markets : entry and mergers

GABSZEWICZ, Jean J.; ZANAJ, Skerdilajda - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2006

This paper analyses successive markets where the intra-market linkage depends on the technology used to produce the final output. We investigate entry of new firms, when entry obtains by expanding the economy, as well as collusive agreements between firms. We highlight the differentiated effects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043038

A note on successive oligopolies and vertical mergers

GABSZEWICZ, Jean J.; ZANAJ, Skerdilajda - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2007

In this paper we analyze how the technology used by downstream firms can influence input and output market prices. We show via an example that both these prices increase under a decreasing returns technology while the contrary holds when the technology is constant.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043487

Regulating quality by regulating quantity : a case against minimum quality standards

BOCCARD, Nicolas; WAUTHY, Xavier - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2009

We show in a simple model of entry with sunk cost, that a regulator prefers limiting the output, or capacity, of the incumbent firm rather than imposing a "Minimum Quality Standard" in order to help the entrant to provide high quality. As a by-product, our analysis makes a contribution to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550220

Import restraints and quality choice under vertical differentiation

BOCCARD, Nicolas; WAUTHY, Xavier - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1998

We consider the following stage game : a domestic government chooses an import quota, then a domestic and a foreign ﬁrm choose their quality level before engaging a price competition. We ﬁrst show that the indirect effect of the quota on the sales of the domestic producer are different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008229

On strategic complementarity conditions in Bertrand oligopoly

AMIR, Rabah; GRILO, Isabel - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001

For Bertrand duopoly with linear costs, we establish via a single counterexample that: (i) A new monotone transformation of the firms' profit functions may lead to the supermodularity of transformed profits when the standard log and identity transformations both fail, and (ii) Topkis's notion of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008240

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